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Abstract 
 
This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Master of Science (MSc) in Banking & Finance 
at the International Hellenic University.  
This research investigates the presence of behavioral finance phenomena in five members of 
the European Union known as PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain). According 
to the behavioral finance point of view it is easier to comprehend how investors will 
counteract. To elaborate, the paper provides evidence for empirical testing including four 
independent variables on the variability of trading volume. Daily returns of the PSI – 20 
Index (Portugal Stock Exchange), the FTSEMIB Index (Italian Stock Exchange), the Irish Stock 
Exchange named ISEQ 20, the General Index of Athens Stock Exchange and the IBEX35 Index 
(Spanish Stock Exchange) are reported. 
In the sample, data for five different capital markets over the period from January 01, 2010 
to December 31, 2015 were analyzed. Our approach in the analysis suggests that investor’s 
decision making process is influenced by both psychological and emotional factors. 
Moreover, business is affected by investor’s illogical behavior so the assumption can be 
discarded for the considered markets. 
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1. Introduction 
Regarding the European economic situation during the last five decades, it is hard to realize 
how economy operates. It is indispensable to present recent coefficients in addition to 
rationality to explicate the evolution of trading volume in markets. Many authors suggested 
that the profitable trade hypothesis losses of attention and the rationality fails to interpret 
the immoderate volatility and trading volume noticed in international markets. Moreover, a 
part of investigation approaches markets from a prospect based on the hypothesis that 
markets, institutions and investors prove a development agreed to the “rules’’ of financial 
option. 
According to the behavioral finance point of view it is easier to comprehend how investors 
will counteract. Dhaoui (2011) mentioned that behavioral finance area is briefed in 
substance to interpret financial market irregularities on the principle of the research of 
investors’ decision process. 
The behavior of stock return and trading volume, can be substituted by measuring rational 
expectation with different factors. To elaborate, factors such as optimism (Haruvy et al. 
1999), pessimism (De Bondt 1987), confidence (Daniel 1998) and rational expectations 
(Barberis et al. 1998) are assumed to expound the sensational upheaval of progress of 
trading volumes and that of returns.  
As the crisis expanded, not only one or two but more countries have been intensively facing 
economic problems. My study takes the investigation of Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and 
Spain. Decomposing the conflict between rational investors and irrational, we focus on 
analysis which covers six years from January 2010 to December 2015 and includes the daily 
prices of the most serious indicators traded on capital markets and the diurnal trading 
volume for each index. In general, optimistic and confident investors are eager to make 
dangerous investments. They make unreasonable trades and their unreasonable 
counteractions can conduct to unusual volatility in returns. Awaited outcomes can give an 
idea of the above factors that influence proximately the progress of trading in markets of 
each country. 
The research is based on data from five different International Capital Markets (Portugal, 
Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain) over the period from January 01, 2010 to December 31, 
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2015. It is known that behavioral biases influence the evolution of trading in capital markets 
and in the following sections the methodology and data framework of this study are 
described. 
This dissertation is organized into five different chapters. The first one entitled “The PIIGS 
Crisis” investigates possible explanations of media attention in these particular countries 
with their economic instability. The chapter “Theoretical Background and Empirical 
Evidence” is a detailed literature review of behavioral finance perspective. Continuously, the 
chapter “Sample Period and Research Design” puts forward the capital markets 
investigated, provides the collected data under analysis and describes proxy for used 
variables and empirical model specifications. The chapter “Empirical Results” analyzes the 
results of technical analysis conducted with the aid of Microsoft Excel and EViews. Finally, 
the chapter “Concluding Remarks and Limitations” provides an overview of our findings and 
promising fields that need further investigation. 
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2. The PIIGS Crisis 
PIIGS is an acronym which refers to the following countries: Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece 
and Spain. The financial crisis made these countries economically weaker and since euro is 
their currency, they were obliged to follow Eurozone’s monetary policy to battle the 
economic downturn. 
The PIIGS have been a significant lug on the Eurozone’s financial recovery following the 
2008 crisis, contributing to slow GDP growth, high unemployment, deficits and debt rates. 
Specifically, the increasingly unsustainable levels of public and private debt led to bailouts 
financed by the European Union and International Monetary Fund. Of course, PIIGS is not 
an official title but became appropriate for investors to division these regions. Each member 
has become a “bad”’ example and stirred media attention. As a result, practitioner 
organizations and institutions have made exertions to remove the stipulation because of its 
negative meaning. However, undoubtedly PIIGS have a history of facing fiscal instability.  
2.1 Portugal 
Portugal is the 14th greatest economy in Europe. Its population is approximately 10 million 
people and it is an agriculture – based economy because of its high exportation rates which 
are close to 75%. 
Overall, the Portuguese economy was in serious trouble before the financial crisis. Budget 
deficits combined with strict macroeconomic imbalances provoked the first worrying 
results. Although in previous years low interest rates were not preventive of being part of 
Eurozone with economic expansion and high expectations regarding future productivity, 
Portugal faced liquidity and banking sector problems later on. 
Financial instability was not restricted to macroeconomic rates. Because of the crisis, it was 
obvious that human capital investments and skills available to the Portuguese were low. The 
under – investment in education leads to low productivity. At the turn of the century, 
Portugal had one of the lowest rates of education achievements and that was a high priority 
trouble for governors. Thus, when Portugal’s sovereign bond rating was cut in summer 2010 
because of wage setting system, the economy destabilized dramatically and investments 
reduced.  
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The government’s priority in response to the crisis had to do with the stability of the 
financial sector. Moreover, they increased public spending and confined public revenue; 
however, access to international markets became extremely difficult after that. In this 
unfavorable environment, in May 2011 the Portuguese government was led to an economic 
rescue plan agreed with the European Union, the European Central Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. 
The economy was set to enter a painful process but in early 2015, the macroeconomic rates 
were under control. Imbalances were eliminated, public finances viably improved and the 
whole condition standardized. In sum, the country’s recovery offers many lessons for policy 
– makers. A remarkable example is to comprehend labor market reforms in any 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Moreover, the wage – setting system must be 
monitored closely in order to increase the European support for low wage earners. 
Understandably, the stabilization of political situation plays a notable role. 
2.2 Italy 
The country in the south of Europe has rich history, famous food and admirable nature. 
Approximately 35 million residents work in the service sector, a fact that could explain the 
high rates of unemployment. Tourism is a leading force in this country which was negatively 
affected since the economic crisis stumbled in 2008. Being one of the biggest economies in 
the Eurozone, Italy has a very high standard of living and its economy is regarded beyond 
median in growth, driven by a cultured, hardworking business force. 
In 2008 when crisis approached, Italy gave a second chance to Berlusconi to carry out 
austerity measures and achieve financial stability. Until then, that was an unusual 
perspective because of big expansion and fulfillment of expensive infrastructural projects. 
Employment took the route of provisional places which ended up in scrub salaries and 
limitations of labor rights, especially affecting younger employees. 
Until Lehman’s Brothers collapse, Italian banks had endured slightly. This fact was the 
starting point of the economic emergency for Italy. There were problems, mainly with the 
liquidity of banks because some of them faced bankruptcy when the crisis arrived. This 
problem forced the government to support banks with loans and the European Central Bank 
to cut down on the discount rate. On the other hand, banks and institutions decreased the 
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availability of trust to customers in order to recover fluidity. At that point, the Italian 
economy joined the international crisis. To elaborate, the country has few large banks and 
many moderate banks functional on a district scale. The crisis affected mostly senior banks 
which damaged liquidity because of global financial crisis. 
Government focused on crisis, firstly by supporting banks and cutting public spending. At 
first glance, this action seemed to be correct because the domino effect of the banks’ fall 
was avoided and large firms were allowed to preserve their employees. Additionally, 
negative impacts on investor’s expectations were avoided due to cuts in public expenditure 
instead of a potential tax increase. 
Unfortunately, the damage for Italy is deep and long lasting. The debt is an obstacle for 
further development and the hopeful perspective for what they faced Italian banks, 
investors and residents, or what they are going to face. 
2.3 Ireland 
The Emerald Isle, as Ireland is usually called, is a well – known tourist destination. During 
the 1990s and 2000s, Ireland participated in the economic development. However, at the 
turn of the millennium, it experienced the same symptoms that influenced many Eurozone 
countries. The response to this potential collapse on government’s behalf was massive 
injections to its banks. 
The lack of competitiveness forced the Irish government to agree over a multi – year 
funding program. It was November, 2010 when the program provided funding 
commitments of €67.5 billion. The ECB was involved as a supervisor and the whole process 
started from restructuring the banking sector through recapitalization. The Bank of Ireland 
remained in majority private ownership because it acquired private equity investment but 
the other banks did not. In other words, only the Bank of Ireland escaped full nationalization 
in contrast with the other six. 
Further evidence based on Ireland’s rates shows us that the program has been successful. 
Banking sector succeeded in targets of the program mostly by selling foreign assets without 
large losses. However, it would be a mistake to assume that full health of banks returned. 
There are several negative features and factors which help banking sector’s uncertainties. 
 
6 
 
This precariousness places the banking sector of Ireland in a suchlike situation to many 
other banks; the default of a permissible long – term funding model. 
It would be fair at this point to mention that there are grounds for optimism about Ireland’s 
growth estimations. In late 2010, the economy bottomed out but after signing the EU – IMF 
agreement a significant steady recovery was observed. In 2011 and 2012, the growth of GDP 
was 1.4 percent and 0.9 respectively. Thus, Ireland’s export growth reflects improvement in 
antagonism. It shows that it had the most considerable amelioration of any other crisis 
countries, but for Germany whose competitiveness enhanced during the boom period. 
To conclude, in a normative approach, Ireland cropped from the recession. However, the 
problems remain, the national debt is huge and this situation is a lesson on how to 
elaborate with difficult situations during a financial crisis. 
2.4 Greece 
Greece is the southernmost member of the European Union with actual population of 
around 10 million and nearly twice tourists a year of 20 million. It is a favorite destination 
for voyagers, because of its rich history and well-known beaches. It is member of EU since 
2001. In finance terms, it also suffers from slow economic growth and high rates of 
unemployment especially in younger ages. It is widely accepted that Greece is the most 
troubled member of PIIGS elaborating its share depravation and civil agitation. 
The debt crisis began in late 2009 and the Greek government, not surprisingly, accepted a 
rescue plan of 110 billion. The negative downturn continued, the initial program has not be 
proved sufficient and Greece supplement by further strict measures and a fiscal stabilization 
plan has been put forward until. 
The Greek crisis was followed by fiscal crisis in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy. Entering 
the euro area and by adopting the euro in 2001, Greece faced a decrease in interest rates 
never thought before. As a result, the nominal interest rate on 10 – year – Greek bond 
declined from 20 percent to 3 and a half percent in 2005. Hence, the adoption of euro gave 
several benefits, in countries like Greece, with high levels of inflation and lack of economic 
policy credibility. Last but not least, the ECB’s supported monetary policy led to a mitigation 
of inflation and financial government uncertainty isolated so it was much easier to borrow 
and lend at a longer horizon. 
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Unfortunately, Greek politicians of that particular growth period did not take advantage of 
the low inflation environment and created financial deficits of 6 per cent of GDP on average. 
It was not a secret that government spending was increased and these negative effects 
reached the Eurozone with worries for Greece and other European countries. In late 2009, 
the whole situation inverted and interest rates began to rise substantially to almost 27 per 
cent. 
Accurately predicting the consequences of a crisis is a tough process. It is probably true that 
the lack of competitiveness is a chronic problem that dates back to the 1970s. This is 
reflected in the huge current account deficit. Recognizing that Greece like several other 
countries faced difficulties, these imbalances are the most profound in the Eurozone.  
The current crisis highlights that a reform of European Union mechanisms must be in force, 
otherwise the stability of the Eurozone will be in danger and the euro currency will be 
affected negatively. 
2.5 Spain 
With population of almost 45 million residents and as the fifth largest economy in the 
European Union, Spain relies strongly on its rich history. Despite its position in the 
problematic countries, it is the 12th largest economy worldwide. However, high rates of debt 
and unemployment brought Spain to face fiscal problems. 
Parts of the reasons that Spain faced these problems as its shocking fiscal thunderstorm 
that started in the late 2000s were limited horws and a large deficiency in accordance with a 
similar real - estate bubble that occurred in Ireland. All the above pushed the country into a 
difficult situation. Generally, it was hard to imagine that this country will fall cruelly and stay 
down so long because of a strong banking system.  
The Spanish government’s initiative of relaxing supervision of financial sector and allowing 
banks to violate International Accounting Standards gave banks the chance to hide losses, 
earn volatility and mislead regulators, analysts, managers and investors. The results were 
devastating for Spain with bankruptcies of major companies while the trade deficit 
increased rapidly. 
During the third quarter of 2008, the national GDP officially entered recession for the first 
time after 15 years. The so – called Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank 
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and International Monetary Fund) negotiated with Spain to establish a financial recovery 
program through European Stability Mechanism. Thus, the European Commission endorsed 
Spanish government’s plan to modify three major Spanish banks – Bankia, MCG Banco and 
Catalonia Banc – and sell a fourth, Banco de Valencia. 
The economic status of Spain started improving by 2013 – 2014. In just two years, Spain 
reduced imports, increased exports and kept high numbers of tourists. Moreover, it 
attained a trade surplus and growth rate was the highest among larger EU economies. 
Although the scars of crisis are deep, Spain hopes that the economic situation will 
standardize and the Spanish financial crisis, also known as the Great Recession in Spain or 
the Great Spanish Depression belongs to the past. 
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3. Theoretical Background and Empirical Evidence 
3.1 Behavioral Anatomy of the Financial Crisis 
The sector that faced many problems such as the drop of liquidity, the devaluation of assets 
and unexpected fluctuations in stock markets was financial sector. As a result, many 
questions arose and in what we conclude was that the neoclassical financial theory do not 
help us. The whole situation forced investors and managers to focus on those human 
behavioral perspectives that may have concurred to the financial crisis. 
3.1.1 Macroeconomic Environment 
The imbalances in the global economy are of vital importance in the macroeconomic 
environment. High demand of E.U economy led to an increasingly unfavorable insanity in 
business and that was one of the material ways. However, the trade deficits of European 
countries raised and apart from that, the E.U economies were also hectored by a growing 
exterior account deficit. As McKinsey Global Institute reported, investments in stock 
markets, debt securities and private equity funds were only 350 billion in 2006. Because of 
this, there was a remarkable decline in profitability of debt securities and cost of equity. 
3.1.2 Greed of Investors and Managers 
It is probably true that fear and greed are two different categories of emotions that 
dominate in investing. Strictly speaking, investing can provide many benefits in the long 
turn, however it is not always an easy procedure for many investors as it is possible to 
provoke a lot of fluctuations along the way. Investors, traders and managers are human and 
capital markets are affected by irrational behavior. Human emotional complexity includes 
feelings such as anxiety, fear and greed. It can push them to buy stocks, bonds or securities 
at very high prices and later sell that same amount at very low prices. All these years, many 
researchers worldwide tried to interpret these pitfalls of investing. Empirical evidence 
shows us that it is of vital importance for investors to take a long – term view and request 
professional advice. 
Shefrin and Statman (2000) mentioned that because of fear the investors tend to hold 
portfolios with safe securities. Greed, in turn, forces people in a rapid growth of 
consumption. In this case, it is difficult for investors to suitably vary their portfolio in order 
to obtain future profits. 
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As Thaler (1999) suggested, greed prevailed many years before the world economic crisis 
appeared. With the excuse of economic growth, investors exercised compulsion on 
managers elaborating with funds requesting high provisions. This point of view, forced 
managers to adopt riskier businesses to fulfill these anticipations. 
3.1.3 Underestimation of Risk 
Szyszka (2010) confirmed that behavioral expectations related to overconfidence. The 
existence of overconfidence is also reflected to the calibration effect. Gribnikov and 
Schevchenko (2012) stated that in specific circumstances, investors follow models, patterns 
and stereotypes instead of illustrating the problem. The paradox of taking the incorrect 
decision twice is appeared. Specifically, investors take one wrong decision, become 
determined that they examined the hypothesis properly and they tend not to transform 
their original opinion. 
According to Keren (1991) and Lichtenstein et al. (1982) people when asked for estimations, 
prefer categories in which they feel safe and possess knowledge.  
De Bondt (1998) stated that stock exchange investors are the perfect example of this 
phenomenon. In certain occasions, they are helpful for the right calibration however 
experts who are conscious for their know – how in a given field may often fall into the trap 
of overconfidence.  
To elaborate, investors and managers are exposed to underestimate the risk. In most cases, 
they are trying to solve it with specific standards, forgetting the process of illustrating the 
problem. 
3.2 Behavioral Finance and Decision Making Process 
There are many differences between traditional and behavioral finance because of the 
complexity of factors they consist of. However, both are high related with decision making 
process. Traditional finance elaborates in using mathematical models for explication of fiscal 
numbers for investment decision making. Usually, financial decisions based on a particular 
stock market and have impact on investor’s decision. Moreover, the systematic or 
unsystematic risk are of vital importance for further investments in a stock market. 
Barber (2008) stated that when people find out that the alternative choice has good 
outcomes, they have feelings of pain. In other words, behavioral finance help us to 
comprehend how emotions of individuals are related to the volatility of share prices. 
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Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), analyzed in their research how these emotions and 
cognitive biases are responsible for stock market anomalies. 
Baker (2010) defined in his research that there is relation between the age of people and 
risks taken. This is a remarkable finding, taking into consideration that people show the 
different level of risk due to the difference in age groups. Similarly, a factor for investment 
behavior of investor or individual is the gender. Recent price fluctuation, risk minimization, 
wealth maximization and social responsibility are other factors that influence financial 
decision making process. Generally, it is useful in an attempt to understand how you can 
temperament the unreasonable ingredients of investment decisions while still gratifying 
your individual predilections and requirements. 
Ritter (2013) was the researcher who extensively explained that this type of finance 
develops the combination of psychological theory, with finance and traditional economics 
that provide the deduction about the irrational decision making of investors. Analytically, 
there are two deviations in investors or manager’s financial attitude which help us 
understand their rationale deeply. 
i) Cognitive Deviations: Derived by time, limitations etc. and have priority for 
behavioral finance. 
ii) Emotional Deviation: Individual’s behavior that is common in behavioral theory. 
3.3 Cognitive Psychology 
Kliger and Kudryavtsev (2010) mentioned that there are two building blocks which are 
dependent variables of behavioral finance. Cognitive psychology and arbitrage are these 
particular blocks. Cognitive psychology is about considering errors implicate when people 
think about investment. Boundaries of arbitrage refer to foretelling the appropriate way of 
investing, namely under what circumstances will be gainful or not. 
Ritter (2013) suggests that this type of psychology studies the behavior of people when they 
invest in stocks or other products of efficient markets. In this point of view, cognitive biases 
have an effect on the way managers take decisions for an investment. All these factors, 
biases and variables show us the whole economic situation and impact in markets. Factors 
that are linked to cognitive psychology are the following: 
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3.3.1 Heuristics 
Kahneman (2003) defined heuristics as cognitive shortcuts that represent a process of 
replacing a complex query with a simpler one. Generally, heuristic methods can be used to 
speed up the process of finding a solution in impossible or impractical problems. Similarly, 
in psychology, heuristics are efficient rules that have been recommended to explicate how 
people make decisions, come to estimations and solve their difficulties when facing 
complicated situations. However, it is possible that these cognitive shortcuts lead to 
systematic errors but in certain cases they work well. There are various methods for 
researchers to test if people use heuristics. 
3.3.2 Overconfidence 
Kliger and Kudryavtsev (2010) mentioned that confidence signifies realistically trusting one’s 
efficiencies while overconfidence usually signifies an overly optimistic appreciation of one’s 
knowledge or control over a situation. 
De Bondt and Thaler (1995), through their psychological research, defined overconfidence 
as the investor’s tendency to overestimate the probability of precision of their references, 
their successes and their capabilities. The researchers continue, highlighting that this feeling 
is related with individuals who underestimate the margins of mistake in their own 
estimations. By ignoring any belief from rational investors in most cases they do not result 
in a profit. On the contrary, they complicate their position but their pride in their beliefs 
shows their level of confidence. 
3.3.3 Mental Accounting 
People’s tendency to separate their money into different accounts is called mental 
accounting. This trend is based on a diversity of subjective criteria like the source and 
amount of money. According to that, people delegate different functions which often lead 
to irrational consumption behavior. They treat money differently because people think 
value in relative rather than absolute terms. As a result, individuals often fail to examine 
opportunity costs and are vulnerable to failure. 
Thaler (1985) related mental accounting with money’s provenance and future use instead of 
thinking in terms of financial utility. Behind the theory of mental accounting a vital factor 
which humans forget to take into consideration named fungibility underlies. This term 
stands for reminding us that all money is the same and has no labels. Nowadays, the biggest 
mistake is that we plan assets as property to current wealth, present or future income but 
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marginal tendency to consume is highest for money in the present income and lowest in the 
future (Thaler, 1990). Credit cards are a notable example of mental accounting. According to 
the theory, humans have the feeling of exemption from the payment by separating and 
delaying it. 
3.3.4 Framing Effect 
According to Kahneman and Tversky’ s (1979) prospect theory, choices are divided in a way 
that highlights the positive or negative aspects of the same decision and conduct changes in 
their respective attractiveness. To elaborate, prospect theory framed gambles in terms of 
losses or gains. Alternatives types of framing approximations have been constantly 
identified including examples of our daily lives. Moreover, attribute framing and goal 
framing are other types of framing effect. In finance terms, research has shown that 
investors are just as responsive to framing as in other areas of life. There is a 
misunderstanding referring to potential finance options. Humans hope that the list of 
expendable fund options would have no effect on portfolio distribution choices. 
Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that in lists that contain fewer equity funds, the 
proportion of the portfolio that is distributed to equities is lower. On the other hand, it is 
higher for lists of available fund options which contain a majority of equity funds. Generally, 
what should be irrespective to investor’s allocation choices can have a large unintentional 
impact on portfolio risk. This is the reason why framing is extremely significant in 
determining the level of risk taken. 
3.3.5 Representativeness 
Representativeness is the scope when an event is representative of its parent population. If 
this applies to behavioral finance, especially heuristic, we often wrongly judge that 
something is more representative than it actually is. 
Kahneman (2003) defined representativeness as heuristics that used to criticize the 
likelihood that an event A belongs to class B by looking at the degree to which A related 
with B. This bias is similar in substantial characteristics to its fundamental population and 
reverberates features of the procedure by which it derives. 
In most cases, when individuals rely on this kind of heuristics to make estimations, they 
judge wrongly because taking into consideration that something is more representative, 
does not really make it more probable. When similarities of factors or events are evaluated 
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and organized in categories then we conclude in description of representativeness 
heuristics. Despite the fact that this heuristic constitutes an easy computation, a serious 
problem is that people overrate their ability to predict the possibility of an event. 
3.3.6 Conservatism 
Conservatism is a mental process in which people connect their forecasts at the expense of 
recognizing new information. Because of conservatism, people fail to react rationally in the 
face of new evidence and as a result they overweight base rates and underreact to sample 
evidence. The fear of taking a step further in order to become profitable too soon to lock in 
profits, in most cases turns into reversal situation and losses. Tilson (2004) noticed that this 
apprehension is a motion that frequently controls intelligence decision and investors cannot 
filter facts which may give profits and utility. However, this kind of investments has lower 
level of risk compared with others. In reality, a risk averse investor is beaten by a risk lover. 
Barber and Odean (2008) stated that in finance terms, conservatism urges humans retain 
their initial decision without suitably incorporating new information. As a consequence, 
instead of learning news which may be meaningful, a potential investor acts following old 
information, although he is deeply willing to act like a risk lover. Rationally, when you 
interpret this, you can see how ridiculous this sounds. 
3.3.7 Disposition Effect 
This illogical effect focuses on the tendency of investors to sell shares whose price has 
increased while keeping assets that have dropped in value. In particular, the research of 
Ritter (2013) focuses on the concept of investors tendency to ‘’hold on to losers, but sell 
winners’’. It is widely accepted that behaving like this, does not make sense. Analytically, 
from an investment perspective, a security or stock’s future performance is irrelevant to the 
price at which the investor purchased the product. 
A potential explanation for this particular behavior is because selling a security at a loss 
would be similar as confessing they were wrong on a trade. At the same time, the opposite 
side, realizing gains, demonstrates that the investor was right. In other words, this is a 
strong hit at investor’s pride and beliefs. One important reason investors should be aware of 
this effect is the above. Papathanasiou et al (2015) found that investors sell due to the 
disposition effect. As a result, it is much better for them to hold well-performing stocks 
longer and sell the losing stocks sooner. Houthakker and Williamson (1996) confirmed that 
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investors sell due to the disposition effect (the winners) tend to outperform the stocks 
investors continue to retain (the losers). 
3.3.8 Loss Aversion 
In this sub – chapter the basic and most important fact is that people prefer avoiding losses 
to acquiring equivalent gains. In economics and decision theory, this leads to risk aversion 
when people evaluate an outcome including similar gains and losses. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) related loss aversion with prospect theory and resulted to 
the expression ‘’losses loom larger than gains’’. This concept is based on the idea that the 
pain of losing is psychologically about twice as powerful as the success of gaining. Hence, 
loss aversion is in accordance to the marginal usefulness of money where the first dollars 
having more precious than extra dollars. 
Consequently, cognitive biases have an impact on decision making process. There are two 
type of variables that make influence on investor’s decision: i) Heuristics ii) Prospect Theory. 
 
3.4 The impact of Behavioral Finance on Capital Markets 
In this chapter, it is vital to analyze that behavioral finance is a new field of studies, having a 
significant role in financial decision approach. Mandelbrot and Hudson (2004), proved that 
it stands for an area that tries to comprehend and explicate how cognitive errors sway 
investors, trades and capital markets. Recognizing that the field of finance has recorded 
notable last years, it is important not to omit that behavioral finance combined with other 
social sciences represents a revolution in financial theory. It is a promising field which 
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highlights the psychological edge of investment decision making process, in strong 
contradiction to the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. 
However, the way in which the investment procedure is managed must be clearly 
understood as a field in full development with major allusions. 
Fromlet (2001) stated that forecasting a financial market from the psychological and 
emotional scope is a tough process with many difficult aspects which demand further 
investigation. In these conditions, there is evidence regarding the efficient market theory 
that is not possible to outperform the market in the long term. Peters (2004) mentioned 
that stock prices reflect all relevant information that are available to all potential investors 
and managers. It is certainly not possible to separate an investor’s personality and any 
decisions they may take. Moreover, as mentioned before, it is important to understand the 
individual financial behavior of capital market investors. As Pompian and Logo (2004) 
suggested, it is needless to make diffusive research in order to conclude that investment 
decisions do not focalize strictly on economic notion. In addition, both amateurs and 
practitioners choose in a way that is not rational. 
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4. Sample Period and Research Design 
In this section, the sample selection procedure, the investigated capital markets and the 
collected data are illustrated. Also, the proxy that represents optimism, pessimism, 
confidence and rational expectations and specifies a pattern appropriate for depicting their 
impacts on trading volume. 
4.1 Sample Period and Data Collection 
The sample used in the analysis dates from January 01, 2010 to December 31, 2015 for the 
PIIGS Capital Markets. Five different indices, the PSI – 20 Index (Portugal Market), the 
FTSEMIB Index (Italian Market), the ISEQ 20 (Irish Market), the Athens Stock Exchange Index 
(Greek Market) and the IBEX35 Index (Spanish Market) were studied. For the financial 
statement data, the databases used were Bloomberg and Yahoo Finance. Collecting all the 
needed data and after retreatment to eliminate non-trading days for each market, we have 
a sample includes 1535 observations for the Portuguese Market, 1521 for the Italian, one 
fewer observation for the Irish Market which means 1520, 1467 for the Greek one and 
finally 1534 observations for the Spanish Market. 
4.2 Capital Markets Investigated 
The Portuguese Stock Exchange named PSI – 20 is a benchmark stock market index which 
elaborates the performance of 20 companies with the largest capitalization in Euronext 
Lisbon Stock Exchange and it is a free – float, capitalization weighted index. The PSI – 20 
Index has a base of 3.000 points as of December 31, 1992. 
The FTSE MIB is an Italian benchmark stock market index for the Borsa Italiana, the Italian 
national stock exchange. It consists of the 40 most – traded stock classes and until 2009 was 
administered by Standard & Poor’s. After that, the responsibility passed to FTSE Group 
which is 100% owned by the Borsa Italiana’s subsidiary company London Stock Exchange 
Group. 
The Irish Stock Exchange is named ISEQ 20. The ISEQ Overall Index comprises of 20 different 
companies with the highest trading volume and market capitalization. The ISEQ 20 is a 
benchmark stock market index which includes these particular companies. The index was 
started on December 31, 2004 at a base of 1.000 points. 
The Athens Stock Exchange is a major stock market index composed with the performance 
of Greek stocks, ASE is a capitalization – weighted index on 60 stocks quoted, having 
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similarities with the Portuguese index. The ASE General Index has a base value of 100 as of 
December 31, 1980. 
The IBEX 35 is the official index of the Spanish Market. The index consists of the 35 most 
liquid stocks traded on the continuous market. Sociedad de Bolsas has the responsibility of 
calculations and supervision. The index was created with a base level of 3.000 points as of 
December 29, 1989. 
 4.3 Proxy for used variables and Empirical Model specifications 
Using the model described below, the variables which can likely explicate the immoderate 
trading volume in the major markets in the PIIGS countries are depicted. 
Proxy for used variables can be described as follows: 
1. Muth (1961) formulated the theory of rational expectations and became influential in 
modelling economic and behavioral phenomena. Investor’s rational expectations can be 
introduced mathematically by the following relation:  
 
P (t+1) = E (t) P (t+1) +ε (t+1) 
 
where P(t+1)   is the security price at time t+1 and ε( t+1) is the estimation error. The 
residual factor is the only term in the above relation that is randomly affected by new 
information which is unknown to any of the investors. 
 
2. It is probably true that investors, dominated by optimism, overreact when they expect 
that profit ranges at a fixed level. At this point of view they react normally or decide not 
to trade. Let’s consider that optimism supervenes when the day before investors achieve 
a fixed level of gains. Under these circumstances, they react in a way that the volume of 
transactions rise. In addition, if the returns acquire lower level, they will decide to 
abstain from trading. We examine the lowest level connived by optimistic investors 
depending on which way they make up their minds on their trading behavior (Dhaoui, 
2011). Moreover, optimists trade combatively when returns of that particular period are 
equal or greater than the value set by them. 
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The following relation describes the behavior of optimistic investors: 
{if: R(t−1)>=Ṝ + σ -> there will be transactions} 
{if:  R(t−1)<Ṝ + σ -> there will be no transactions} 
  
3. On the contrary, pessimistic investors reduce their trading when they forecast that 
losses attain a crucial level. In this study, we took into account the minimum loss level 
endured by pessimists. In other words, it is vital for the decision making of pessimistic 
investors not to exceed the value set by them. They will not trade when the loss in the 
previous period is high. In any other case, if the loss is smaller then they will continue to 
exchange and merchandise. 
 
The following relation describes the behavior of optimistic investors: 
{if:  R(t−1)>=Ṝ- σ -> there will be transactions} 
{if:  R(t−1)<Ṝ- σ -> there will be no transactions} 
 
4. The confidence proxy is the change in stock return. Previous returns (R (t−1)) and current 
trading volume (Vt) describes the relation between confidence and trading volume. 
Furthermore, investors after examining information they own, may increase their 
transactions, taking into consideration the potential positive returns. Many times, this is 
a significant problem because they overrate their estimation capabilities, they 
underestimate their exposure to risk and act aggressively. In our study, we deduce that 
heavy transactions are expected when the security returns on the foregoing day are 
positive (including zero). On the other hand, if security returns are negative then 
investors react in two different ways. They continue their trading strategy or abstain 
from exchanging. The previous return will be affected by the relation of independent and 
dependent variable and as result trading volume changes. 
 
The following relation describes the behavior of confident investors: 
{if:  R(t−1)>= 0 -> there will be transactions} 
{if:  R(t−1)< 0 -> there will be no transactions} 
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To sum up, the model can be presented as follows: 
𝑽𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝑹𝑬𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝑶𝒑𝒕𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝑷𝒆𝒔𝒕 + 𝜶𝟒𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒕 + 𝜺𝒕 
where, 
𝑽𝒕: represents the natural logarithm of the trading volume in the time t 
𝑹𝑬𝒕: represents the returns that are rationally expected by rational investors in the time t 
considering available information in the time (t-1) 
𝑶𝒑𝒕𝒕: represents the returns expected by optimistic investors in the time t considering 
available information in the time (t-1) 
𝑷𝒆𝒔𝒕: represents the returns expected by pessimistic investors in the time t considering 
available information in the time (t-1) 
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒇𝒕: represents the returns expected by overconfident investors in the time t considering 
the gains they realize in the time (t-1) 
𝜺𝒕: is the error term 
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5. Empirical Results 
This chapter analyzes the results of technical analysis made through Microsoft Excel and 
EViews. There are three sub – chapters. The first one reports descriptive statistics of daily 
returns. In sub – chapter 2, the research starts testing the stationary of dependent and 
independent variables through Ducky Fuller unit root test for each variable. Finally, the last 
one summarizes the results of the regression analysis. 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
By providing simple summaries of sample and measures, it is easier to interpret the 
quantitative analysis. The tables below decompose the standard statistical results for daily 
returns for the PIIGS Capital Markets. Using EViews, the basic assumptions which can easily 
derive, are that these particular returns demonstrate immoderate kurtosis and non – 
normality in returns. In addition, Jarque - Bera p-value for tables 1-5 rejects normality. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for daily returns for PSI- 20 Index (Portugal Market) 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for daily returns for FTSEMIB (Italian Market) 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for daily returns for ISEQ (Irish Market) 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for daily returns for ASE (Greek Market) 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for daily returns for IBEX 35 (Spanish Market) 
 
5.2 Test of Stationary 
The Dickey – Fuller test, named after the statisticians David Dickey and Wayne Fuller, 
developed the test in 1979. It tests the null hypothesis in statistics. Our main purpose is to 
examine if a unit root is present in an autoregressive model. On the contrary, there is 
alternative hypothesis which depends on which version of the test we focus, but is usually 
stationarity. In this paper, for each capital market it is vital to test the stationary of 
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dependent and independent variables. The table below summarizes and presents the 
results of Ducky Fuller unit root test for each variable. 
Table 1: Ducky Fuller unit root test for dependent and independent variables 
[1%  Critical Value : - 3.4344] ;  [5%  Critical  Value : - 2.8632] ; [10%  Critical Value: - 2.5677]  
Capital Market  
Dependent variable  Independent variables  
Trading Volume Confidence Optimism Pessimism Rational expectation  
Portugal -3.505 -36.449 -24.592 -36.299 -13.366 
Italy -8.318 -39.712 -37.532 -40.283 -9.527 
Ireland -7.777 -39.725 -38.644 -38.972 -11.467 
Greece -4.373 -36.300 -10.882 -35.839 -10.260 
Spain -10.964 -36.857 -35.392 -36.895 -9.600 
 
There is no doubt that, as the results of the above table indicate, all dependent and 
independent variables are stationary. To elaborate, in absolute terms, all variables are 
stationary at three different critical levels: 1%, 5% and 10%. 
5.3 Regression Analysis 
Using econometric regression, we can highlight the conflict between rational expectation 
and investor’s feeling. Errors, also known as rational and non – rational behavior of 
investors, can be noticed through the research of these particular coefficients in trading 
volume for five capital markets considered. 
Following the methodology of technical analysis and using EViews program, we ran an 
autocorrelation test and heteroscedasticity test through BREUSCH – PAGAN – GODFREY and 
problems were detected. Autocorrelation problem was resolved through Cohhrain – Orcutt 
test and in the final model heteroscedasticity problem was eliminated too. 
The following table presents the results of regressions in trading volume as dependent 
variable in accordance to each independent variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
Table 1: Results of econometric regressions – Coefficients of independent variables 
Capital 
Market  
Independent variable Coefficients t - statistic   
Portugal 
constant 2,171 177,390 
R-square = 0,0039 
 
Confidence 0,063 1,527 
Optimism 0,003 0,069 
Pessimism -0,032 -1,453 
Rational Expectation -0,007 -0,931 
Italy 
constant 6,504 873,968 
R-square = 0,0047 
 
Confidence -0,034 -1,728 
Optimism 0,041 2,044 
Pessimism 0,018 1,635 
Rational Expectation 0,007 0,206 
Ireland 
constant 6,885 371,972 
R-square = 0,0030 
 
Confidence -0,125 -1,931 
Optimism 0,119 1,853 
Pessimism -0,051 1,283 
Rational Expectation -0,002 0,191 
Greece 
constant 2,307 201,118 
R-square = 0,0014 
Confidence 0,004 0,223 
Optimism 0,014 0,661 
Pessimism -0,004 -0,422 
Rational Expectation 0,001 0,390 
Spain 
constant 10,899 759,086 
R-square = 0,0029 
 
Confidence -0,022 -0,641 
Optimism 0,054 1,628 
Pessimism -0,009 -0,482 
Rational Expectation 0,003 0,552 
 
As we can see in Table 1, the results of investor’s rational expectation for all markets fail to 
explain the trading volume variability. In this sense, it is easily considered that non-rational 
investors affects economy. In other words, rationality is not a factor which controls the way 
economy works so it can be easily rejected for the above capital markets. The field of 
behavioral finance has registered remarkable progress in explaining the rationality. 
However, it is concluded that it is difficult, for rational investors to dispose of the bad 
estimations of irrational investors. The fact is that limits to arbitrage theory prove that if 
illogical investors cause fluctuations from underlying value, rational investors have no 
power to reverse the whole situation. 
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The presence of pessimism influences significantly the trading volume in the case of Italy 
and Ireland. On the contrary, there is no effect in the cases of Greece and Spain and finally 
the impact in Portugal is significantly negative. Generally, the populations of Greece and 
Spain are two of the most pessimistic ones in the world. They have no trust for the political 
system, they react negatively, mostly the Portuguese, and these effects are obvious during 
and after a fiscal crisis. In addition, many empirical studies show that pessimistic investors 
are risk averse and often make mistakes when they apprehend information and frame their 
future steps. 
Concerning the optimism and the optimistic sentiment, it could be stated that these 
investors have a significant positive effect on trading volume especially for the case of Italy 
market. Moreover, the capital markets of Ireland and Spain react positively in the possibility 
of gaining profits and exhibit strong underestimation of their exposition to risks. On the 
other hand, the capital markets of Portugal and Greece, as the results indicate, do not take 
advantage of opportunities that can occur in the short term. In other words, the investors of 
these two particular countries are risk averse and take decisions based on financial literacy 
and arithmetical skills in contrast to the others that are based on optimistic feelings. 
Taking into consideration the independent variable of confidence, the results of the table 
present a positive impact on the trading volume for the case of Portugal. It is observed that 
this can be considered as a non-surprising result. The Portuguese population is more 
exposed to confidence biases. As a consequence, this underestimation to risk conducts 
Portuguese investors to make offensive reactions and increase trading volume. Regarding 
other markets, it leads us to the outcome that there is a significant negative impact in Italy, 
Ireland and Spain. Although these investors are more informed, they react independently 
and their decisions are based on the previous fiscal experience. Having high level of financial 
literacy, they appreciate precise information about the situation in financial markets and 
make their methodical investor’s investment decisions without leaving their confidence 
feelings to capture them. 
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6. Concluding Remarks and Limitations 
This study provides an overview of the contributions of behavioral finance in financial 
theory. After conducting thorough research of previous literature reviews, it is suggested 
that the combination of financial theory with other social sciences created a new promising 
field which has registered significant progress in the last decades and highlights the 
psychological edge of investment decision making process. 
Regarding the empirical results, an analysis was performed about the effect of behavioral 
finance on five different members, known as PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain), 
of the European Union. We used specific technical analysis rules to explain the behavioral 
phenomenon in the examined capital markets concerning the impact of four independent 
variables on the dependent variable which is trading volume. 
The results seem to agree with previous studies, taking into consideration that the 
hypothesis according to which investors implement rationality fails to interpret in which 
way the financial system operates. As a consequence, it can be mentioned that the 
immoderate trading volume in capital markets of PIIGS cannot be due to the attendance of 
rational investors. 
There are indisputable arguments in favor of behavioral biases (confidence, optimism, 
pessimism, rational expectation) which show us that economy is driven by them. To 
elaborate, in the cases of Italy and Ireland, fluctuations of trading volume appear due to the 
presence of pessimism. In opposition, the results indicate that the variable of confidence 
has a positive impact on the trading volume in Portugal. Continuously, concerning the 
optimistic sentiment, the capital market of Spain reacts positively and finally, as mentioned 
before, the results of investor’s rational expectation for all markets fail to explain the 
trading volume variability. 
The most important issue regarding the behavioral finance in the case of PIIGS is that these 
countries are all members of the European Union and their capital markets are 
characterized by the fact that any information is available to all investors or market 
participants, so the trading volume reflects all relevant information. Due to this, we 
conclude that investors make their selections in a non-rational way. 
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Eventually, this study is not referring on other independent variables such as anxiety, 
overconfidence or reluctance which are helpful as tools to understand the psychology of 
investors behind their decisions. Thus, it would be interesting in extension to this study to 
investigate the deviations of different capital markets over different periods of time (weeks, 
months, years etc.). The transformation of independent variables or replacement with other 
behavioral biases would be an auspicious field for further investigation. In these conditions, 
research which elaborates in capital markets of USA or Asia during the last decades could be 
a distinguished project with effective and promising results. 
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Appendix 
Portugal 1 (Confidence) 
 
Portugal 2 (Optimism) 
 
Portugal 3(Pessimism) 
 
Portugal 4 (Rational Expectation) 
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Portugal 5 (Regression) 
 
Portugal 6 (Tested Regression) 
 
Italy 1 (Confidence) 
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Italy 2 (Optimism) 
 
Italy 3 (Pessimism) 
 
Italy 4 (Rational Expectation) 
 
Italy 5 (Regression) 
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Italy 6 (Tested Regression) 
 
Ireland 1 (Confidence) 
 
Ireland 2 (Optimism) 
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Ireland 3 (Pessimism) 
 
Ireland 4 (Rational Expectation) 
 
Ireland 5 (Regression) 
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Ireland 6 (Tested Regression) 
 
Greece 1 (Confidence) 
 
Greece 2 (Optimism) 
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Greece 3 (Pessimism) 
 
Greece 4 (Rational Expectation) 
 
Greece 5 (Regression) 
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Greece 6 (Tested Regression) 
 
Spain 1 (Confidence) 
 
Spain 2 (Optimism) 
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Spain 3 (Pessimism) 
 
Spain 4 (Rational Expectation) 
 
Spain 5 (Regression) 
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Spain 6 (Tested Regression) 
  
